The impact of quantitative easing on the volatility of US and European corporate bond markets: A cross-country analysis by Nguyen, Ngoc Thinh
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The impact of quantitative easing on the volatility of US and European corporate 
bond markets 
 
A cross-country analysis 
 
 
 
Nguyen Ngoc Thinh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Business 
Bachelor's Thesis 
Supervisor: Roman Stepanov 
Date of approval: 13 April 2018 
 
 
 
Aalto University 
School of Business 
Bachelor´s Program in International Business 
Mikkeli Campus 
 
  
AALTO UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS 
Mikkeli Campus 
 ABSTRACT OF 
BACHELOR’S THESIS 
 
Author: Nguyen Ngoc Thinh 
Title of thesis: The impact of quantitative easing on the volatility of US and 
European corporate bond markets - A cross-country analysis 
 
Date: 13 April 2018 
Degree: Bachelor of Science in Economics and Business Administration  
Supervisor: Roman Stepanov 
 
Objectives  
 
This paper seeks to first and foremost evaluate the nuances that differentiate 
quantitative easing (QE), as employed in the last financial crisis, from 
conventional monetary policies, with updates for the recent round of QE by 
the European Central Bank (ECB). Such differences then facilitate an 
investigation of whether QE by the Federal Reserve System and the ECB 
reduced volatility of domestic and international corporate bonds. We 
simultaneously assess potential transmission channels that could explain how 
any of the discovered effects transpired.  
 
Summary  
 
A review of literature and central bank data reveals technical intricacies of QE 
and interest rate targeting, and of US and Europe QE. The popular volatility 
modelling framework EGARCH, enhanced with exogenous variables to 
capture QE effects, is applied to broad-based Bloomberg US and European 
corporate bond indices. 
 
Conclusions 
 
QE is potent in reversing bond market turbulence that the 2008 financial crisis 
left in its wake, both on domestic and cross-border scales, consistent with the 
signaling channel. The portfolio balancing channel is evident for US QE only, 
and both asset purchase intensity and policy announcement are found to be 
ineffectual in reducing volatility, at least under this model specification.  
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1. INTRODUCTION1 
 
In October 2017, it was announced that the European Central Bank (ECB) would halve 
the size of its formidable bond buying program. Such change in monetary policy 
direction is reminiscent of the “Taper tantrum” that saw transient panic in the US 
markets when the Federal Reserve made an announcement in a similar vein. It 
signifies the end of an era in which unconventional monetary policy has been the 
central tenet of central banks’ policy framework. A reasonable question would be 
whether the market has been too entrenched in its expectation of prolonged 
accommodative monetary policy. Given various positive indicators at the time of the 
announcement, is such dependence healthy? Does quantitative easing’s role in 
ameliorating market turbulence have sound foundation or is it based purely on 
psychological signaling? 
 
This thesis sets out to evaluate the power of quantitative easing (QE) to influence 
corporate bond volatility in two of the world’s biggest markets, the United States and 
the Euro area. Given their size, it would be no surprise that they also affect each other 
and other smaller but highly dependent markets. Spillover effect is hence also a major 
part of the research. The focus on the corporate bond market is justified by the fact 
that it, along with households, constitutes the private market that is the ultimate target 
of any kind of monetary policy. It is responsible for a large portion of both corporate 
financing and investment opportunities. Price and return stability in this area is thus of 
utmost interest to central bankers, who know that it would directly influence the 
macroeconomy. 
 
By employing an extended EGARCH model with exogenous variables to broad-based 
corporate bond indices, this thesis discovers a few key lessons. QE in both areas are 
found to exert clear negative impacts on their respective domestic markets as well as 
each other’s markets with respect to volatility. In other words, QE periods witnessed 
general decrease in return volatility, while periods immediately following them were 
more volatile. But not all QE programs exhibited the desired behavior in the sample 
                                            
1 I would first like to thank Professor Roman Stepanov for his various suggestions that helped improve 
the clarity and accuracy of this research and, crucially, for his assistance in retrieving key data from 
Bloomberg. 
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period, which comprises both the Great Recession of 2008 and the European 
sovereign debt crisis. The ability of daily amount of assets purchased under the 
programs and the announcements to generate changes in volatility is generally either 
small or statistically insignificant. However, related changes in government securities 
price or returns are able to induce rather big changes in return volatility, attesting to 
the existence of the portfolio balance channel for QE. 
 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Section 2 presents relevant 
literature that explores the theory and foundation of the effect of QE on financial 
markets. Section 3 outlines the econometric model and relevant data to answer the 
research questions. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results while 
Section 5 subjects such results to further robustness testing. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There exists broad academic consensus that monetary policy, as implemented by 
central banks, plays a vital role in preserving a healthy economy. When economic 
activity declines due to adverse shocks from crises, this role becomes ever more 
prominent. The 2008 financial crisis exemplifies a situation in which central bank policy 
decisions, though insufficient to fully counter the consequences, alleviated financial 
and macroeconomic conditions and averted a full-scale collapse comparable to the 
1930 Great Depression. Further, due to its severity, the last crisis also prompted all 
major central banks, including the Federal Reserve System (Fed), the Bank of 
England, and the European Central Bank (ECB), to utilize unprecedented measures 
that represented clear aberrations from their standard toolkit. A large body of literature 
has since investigated the impact of such unconventional monetary policies (UMPs) 
on various aspects of the financial market as well as the real economy. This thesis 
contributes to existing research by focusing on the volatility of the corporate bond 
markets. Specifically, it seeks to answer 3 key questions: 
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1) Do the size and timing of quantitative easing policies of the European Central 
Bank affect the volatility of domestically traded corporate bonds in the 
eurozone? 
2) Does ECB bond purchase have a spillover effect on the volatility of US 
corporate bonds? 
3) Does US bond purchase have a spillover effect on the volatility of eurozone 
corporate bonds? 
 
Accordingly, the literature review will be structured as follows: Section 2.1 delineates 
the conditions that justify the usage of UMPs, rather than conventional policies, in the 
first place. Section 2.2 differentiates between quantitative easing and orthodox 
monetary policy. These 2 sections provide the context for further analysis answering 
the research questions. Section 2.3 compares UMPs by the ECB and the Fed and 
provides potential explanations as to the differences or otherwise in results obtained 
for research questions 2 and 3. Section 2.4 outlines the key theoretical and empirical 
research to which this thesis is most related, namely those on volatility and 
international effects of QE.  
 
2.1 Quantitative easing and associated financial conditions 
 
2.1.1 The Zero Lower Bound 
 
Although UMP itself may vary in forms depending on each central bank, conventional 
monetary policy usually only refers to the manipulation of short-term interest rates at 
which central banks provide funds to banks or the interbank money market. According 
to Joyce et al. (2012), central banks base their determination of rates on a variety of 
macroeconomic signals and crucially on the so-called Taylor rule. In normal times, and 
even in mild recessions, these key policy rate decisions have a well-documented effect 
of maintaining low and stable inflation – 2% for most developed economies. 
 
The severity of the 2008 crisis, however, meant that the Taylor rule would recommend 
negative interest rates. As Fawley and Neely (2013) note, assuming unconstrained 
choices, rational agents can, and will, always hold non-interest-bearing cash instead 
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of depositing it in negative rate banks. Therefore, short-term interest rate is said to 
have a Zero Lower Bound (ZLB), and conventional monetary policy was restricted as 
such in the crisis when the ZLB became binding. For practical reasons, however, 
central banks do not necessarily drive rates precisely to zero, but instead keep them 
a little above zero (Rogers et al., 2014). Indeed, interest rates in the euro area and the 
UK remained slightly positive even in periods where the ZLB was considered 
effectively binding (e.g. during 2010 and 2011, figure 1). However, some studies (e.g. 
Fahr et al. (2013)) argue against this conclusion, especially in the case of the euro 
area, leading to differences in comparison between UMPs of different areas, which is 
discussed in Section 2.3. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of key policy rates 
Notes: Effective as of 16 December 2008, the target Fed Funds rate by the Federal Reserve is to be expressed as a range, e.g. 
0-0.25% from 16 December 2008 to 16 December 2015. The grey line represents the upper limit of that range from 16 December 
2008 onwards. 
Source: Bank of England, Federal Reserve, ECB 
 
In such situation, monetary policy works via manipulation of future rate expectations 
using UMPs, which aim to replace now ineffectual conventional policies (Lenza et al., 
2010). Curdia and Woodford (2011) employ an extended New Keynesian model to 
prove the efficacy of credit easing, a specific form of UMP, when financial markets 
become disrupted enough to enforce the ZLB. Although they do not provide specific 
analysis, they also implicitly support the use of quantitative easing in similar 
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circumstances. As demonstrated next, such disruption occurred primarily in the 
financial sector. 
 
2.1.2 The breakdown of financial intermediation 
 
Giannone et al. (2011) identifies the collapse of financial intermediation as an 
important step that propagated the deleterious impact of the 1930 Great Depression. 
Financial intermediaries are central to the transmission of monetary policy to the 
macroeconomy in all regions, but especially so in the euro area. They fulfil this role by 
providing loans to the private sector, thereby transforming changes in key policy rates 
to changes in market rates, which in turn help price all fixed income securities. 
 
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, solvency concerns about other banks arose in 
the interbank market. According to Giannone et al. (2012), information asymmetry 
exacerbated the situation, leading to adverse selection, resulting in some institutions 
being barred from the interbank market altogether due to their heightened credit risk. 
Heider et al. (2009), by modeling the interbank market, suggest that such 
stigmatization can result in the freezing of the interbank market, as it indeed did. If one 
institution refuses to provide wholesale funding to its counterparties, other institutions 
may feel pressured into doing likewise, culminating in a rapid spiral of forced 
deleveraging (Giannone et al., 2012). 
 
Moreover, to the extent that banks are perturbed by their solvency, they are 
incentivized to hoard cash instead of lending them out. Both reasons seriously 
impaired the transmission channel of monetary policy, further demanding central 
banks to consider other alternatives. Unsurprisingly, as discussed below, these 
unconventional alternatives aimed to either replace or recover financial intermediation 
in both the US and the euro area, despite implementation differences. 
 
 
2.2 Quantitative easing versus short-term interest rates instruments 
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To properly understand the impact of UMPs on financial markets, this section seeks 
to compare UMPs to previously mentioned conventional interest rate innovations. 
 
2.2.1 Definition of quantitative easing 
 
Despite a decade’s worth of research on unconventional alternatives at the ZLB, there 
seems to be inconsistency in academics’ definition of what constitutes UMPs. 
According to Bernanke et al. (2004) and as summarized by Lehto (2014), the 
alternatives can be roughly categorized into 3 groups: 
 
• Expectations management via communication strategies: e.g. by signaling 
commitment to a future interest rates path 
• Quantitative easing (QE): Expansion of monetary base, specifically the central 
bank balance sheet, by providing banks with excess reserves 
• Credit easing (CE): Changes in the composition of the central bank balance 
sheet by purchasing unconventional assets. 
 
In the case of CE, conventional assets are understood as Treasury securities. Since 
the latter two measures are not mutually exclusive, Bernanke (2009) further 
differentiates between QE (as practiced by the Bank of Japan the early 2000s) and 
CE by stating that while QE focuses on the quantity of bank reserves (the central 
bank’s liabilities), CE stresses the composition of loans and securities (the central 
bank’s assets). If CE does not also involve the expansion of the monetary base, it fits 
Lenza et al.’s (2010) description of qualitative easing. Since this was not the case in 
the period sampled, this thesis is not interested in this concept. Joyce et al. (2012) and 
Curdia and Woodford (2011) define CE as the provision of credit directly to the private 
sector via purchases of private sector assets. This captures the fact that CE, as 
practice by the Fed, extends the purchases to include corporate bonds, agency debt, 
and mortgage-backed securities - so-called “unconventional assets.” Giannone et al. 
(2011) add some nuances by characterizing QE as “purchases of assets in functioning 
and liquid market”, although it is unclear what qualifies as “functioning” and “liquid.” It 
can be inferred from Joyce et al (2012) that this might refer to the market for 
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government bonds/bills. In this 2008 crisis, however, Ueda (2009) argues that many 
central banks employed a mixture of both. 
 
The differentiation between QE and CE with respect to the composition of assets 
purchased could be important in explaining the impact of policy on the corporate bond 
market, whose assets were purchased in CE and not QE regimes (according to the 
strict definitions above). For practical purposes, however, quantitative easing (QE) 
in this paper hereinafter refers to the expansion of the monetary base via purchases 
of government and non-government securities. 
 
2.2.2 Comparison between QE and short-term interest rates instruments 
 
Precisely because of its relative novelty, and that its creation was not supported by 
previous academic research, there exists relatively less historical evidence and 
empirical research substantiating QE’s efficacy. Traditional frameworks to assess 
monetary policy have also proved unsuccessful (Fahr et al., 2013). Among existing 
literature, however, most academics concur that QE has been successful in lowering 
medium to long-term bond yields (Gagnon et al. (2011), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011), Hamilton and Wu (2012), Joyce et al. (2012), among others). 
Consequently, QE has the effect of flattening the yield curve when the short-term rate 
is at the ZLB. This is in sharp and most significant contrast with conventional monetary 
policy, which targets short-term interest rates. It should hence have muted influence 
on the other end of the yield curve, which is in fact more relevant for investment 
decision making and is the desired target of monetary policy. This puzzle about 
standard policy that Bernanke and Gertler (1995) point out has been partially resolved 
by QE. 
 
Regardless, QE is certainly not without shortcomings. A report titled “Quantitative 
easing: Implications for bond market volatility” (2012) points out that QE serves as the 
monetization of government deficit via the creation of bank reserves. Evidently, the 
ensuing loss of foreign investors’ confidence in the national currency could cause an 
exchange rate collapse, and, if uncontained, a sovereign crisis. Joyce et al. (2010) 
emphasizes that UMPs such as QE should only be deployed so long as the ZLB 
constrains the potency of traditional methods, not as a panacea. 
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Another crucial aspect where QE differs from its orthodox peer is its overt emphasis 
on quantity. As Hamilton and Wu (2012) suggest (but have not empirically tested), 
doubling the amount of asset purchased could double the effect on yields and, 
naturally, the amount of bank reserves. Meanwhile, in normal times, orthodox policy 
targeting key interest rates functions via open market operations in which central 
banks sell or buy securities from the banking sector, thereby influencing the level of 
reserves the sector holds at central banks. Crucially, these fluctuations in reserves are 
the by-product, not the intended effect, of monetary policy (Joyce et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, these market operations are designed to exert negligible impact on asset 
prices since their size is small compared to the overall Treasury securities market 
(Gagnon et al., 2011). For QE, the opposite is true: its unprecedented proportion had 
a strong impact on yields and ultimately asset prices. 
 
 
2.3 Overview of ECB and Fed QE programs 
 
Despite sharing the fundamental characteristics just outlined, QE programs by the 
ECB and the Fed are by no means identical. Differences in financial structures of both 
parties necessarily warrant different designs of asset purchase programs. Such 
differences are not as drastic between the Fed and the Bank of England as they are 
between the Fed and the ECB, justifying the comparison between the latter. 
 
2.3.1 Nonstandard monetary policy and QE programs in the euro area 
 
Details of both conventional and unconventional measures implemented by the ECB 
since the onset of the crisis are not only readily available from its website but also well-
documented in literature (see Lenza et al. (2010), Giannone et al. (2011, 2012), 
Fawley and Neely (2013), among others). Notwithstanding, since the ECB abstained 
from outright major asset purchases for a long period, its early measures, though 
unconventional in nature, cannot be characterized as QE. Later measures, notably the 
large-scale asset purchase programs, are scarcely researched due to their relatively 
more recent implementation. Yet it is these measures that are of utmost interest to this 
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thesis as they are directly comparable to those practiced in the US and provide some 
contrast to the policies implemented earlier in the euro area itself. However, an 
overview of all ECB UMPs is presented next, followed by a comparison to that of the 
US. 
 
After Lehman Brothers collapsed, and before the initiation of QE, Joyce et al. (2012) 
identify repo operations as ECB’s distinct tool. Essentially, the ECB buys the security 
while simultaneously agreeing to sell it again if needed (Lenza et al., 2010). They 
describe this trade as a “collateralized loan of central bank liquidity.” Prior to the 
collapse, this provision was conducted via one-week repos with variable rate tender. 
After the collapse, the ECB embarked on a fixed rate full allotment (FRFA) regime, 
where liquidity was provided in unlimited amount at price conditions determined by the 
ECB (Giannone et al., 2011). Due to heightened demand for liquidity in a dysfunctional 
market, this created a significant increase in ECB balance sheet size, though 
negligible when compared to that of the Fed. Further, the list of eligible collateral and 
the average maturity of repos were also expanded, up to 36 months in the case of the 
latter (Lenza et al., 2010). 
 
On May 7, 2009, the ECB introduced the €60 billion covered bond purchase program 
(CBPP) to alleviate the stress on the covered bond market. This represented only 
2.5% of the outstanding bonds (Fawley and Neely, 2013). Further, then-ECB President 
Jean-Claude Trichet explicitly emphasized that CBPP was not QE, nor would it expand 
the ECB balance sheet. Subsequent programs (CBPP2 launched in November 2011 
and the on-going CBPP3 in October 2014) also pale in comparison to the size of Fed 
asset purchase programs. However, they involve more significant private sector asset 
purchases than any other central banks (ibid.), which should have a direct impact on 
such sector (Gagnon et al., 2011), including the corporate bond market as investigated 
in this thesis. 
 
In May 2010, the ECB announced the Securities Markets Program (SMP), which was 
later replaced by Outright Monetary Transactions. Both programs aimed to address 
the European sovereign debt crisis by purchasing government debt in the secondary 
market (Fawley and Neely, 2013). Crucially, as the ECB clarified, they did not have a 
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specific target purchase amount, nor would they expand the monetary base. Like the 
CBPPs, they did not constitute QE. 
 
While most of the aforementioned programs are sterilized (Valiante, 2017) in the sense 
that their net impact on the monetary base is trivial, the asset purchase programs 
(APPs) introduced after November 2014 involved the expansion of the ECB balance 
sheet in non-trivial amounts compared to US QE programs. Therefore, they fit the 
above definition of QE. These programs comprise of CBPP3 as well as the Asset-
backed securities purchase program (ABSPP - introduced November 2014), Public 
sector purchase program (PSPP – March 2015), and Corporate sector purchase 
program (CSPP – June 2016). As illustrated in figure 2, PSPP overwhelmingly 
constitutes the bulk of purchases. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: ECB Asset purchase programs monthly net purchases, by program 
 
Because these programs represent relatively recent developments in the ECB policy 
framework, little empirical research has been done to study their impact. Valiante 
(2017) is a rare example, using a difference-in-differences approach to show that 
PSPP has significantly impacted long-term interest rates, thereby soothing the market 
and flattening the yield curve. 
 
2.3.2 Asset purchase programs by the Federal Reserve System 
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Belke et al. (2017) present a concise, up-to-date summary of all UMPs conducted in 
the US in response to the crisis. Rather than reiterating, this paper shall only 
emphasize the key feature: large scale asset purchase programs. These programs, 
starting in November 2008 and ending in October 2014, accumulated $4.4 trillion in 
assets (Figure 3). The analyses to be conducted, however, will also consider the 
Maturity Extension Program (MEP), in which the Fed financed the purchase of 6-30 
years Treasury bonds with the sale of bonds whose maturities were less than 3 years. 
As its name suggest, MEP “extends” Fed’s portfolio maturity with little to no changes 
to its balance sheet (Belke et al., 2017). 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Evolution of the Federal Reserve Balance Sheet 
 
2.3.3 Differences between ECB and US nonstandard measures 
 
As a whole, the Fed’s asset purchase programs expanded its balance by about $3.5 
trillion, roughly 20% of 2014’s GDP (ibid.). Compared to the pre-crisis period, the 
balance sheet has increased more than five-fold. This increase dwarfs the increase of 
the ECB’s balance sheet in the periods preceding its asset purchase programs (Figure 
4). However, it is also evident from Figure 4 that the ECB had had a significantly larger 
balance sheet at the onset of the crisis. Hence, as Lenza et al. (2010) argue, the 
expansion of monetary base via nonstandard operations to accommodate larger 
demand for central bank liquidity was proportionally smaller. As such, the size of the 
increase could be attributed to different starting conditions. 
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Similarly, they also point out that the ECB had also been carrying out large repos 
operations, with allotments up to €300 billion, dwarfing the Fed’s $30 billion. It had 
always had access to nearly 2000 counterparties in the interbank market compared to 
the Fed’s meager 20. Finally, whereas the Fed limited eligible collateral primarily to 
US Treasuries and government agency bonds, the ECB had accepted a wide array, 
including asset-backed securities. Consequently, the paper concludes that few 
alterations to existing framework were needed for the ECB to accommodate increasing 
stress in the market. For the US, more substantial measures were warranted. 
 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of the ECB and the Fed Balance sheets 
 
The ECB also differed from the Fed in its choice to deal overwhelmingly with the 
interbank market, rather than extending its facilities to a broader range of 
counterparties. Perhaps ECB President Trichet provides the best explanation by 
indicating in his 2009 speech the “profound differences in their financial structures.” 
Specifically, while the banking sector in the euro area provides 70% of firms’ external 
financing, the figure is considerably smaller in the US, where market-based sources 
play an integral role. The ECB was then left with no choice but to opt for direct central 
bank intermediation as the collapse of financial intermediation would have a 
detrimental impact on the macroeconomy. 
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That being said, it eventually adopted outright purchase programs, including private 
sector assets, that resulted in the rapid expansion of its monetary base (Figure 4). 
Valiante (2017) suggests existing measures were insufficient to boost the bank lending 
that is so essential for improved economic growth and inflation, which contradicts early 
theoretical findings by Lenza et al. (2010). Lehto (2014) attempts to explain such late 
adoption by citing burdensome politics as a factor that precludes the ECB’s freedom 
to adopt early and sizeable QE programs, instead opting for collateralized lending. 
Indeed, recent APPs are crucially constrained by the 25% limit, prohibiting holdings 
exceeding 25% of total eligible debt securities from an issuing national state (Claeys 
et al., 2015). This stems from the restrictions set forth by the Lisbon Treaty that prevent 
the Eurosystem from conducting purchases that can be conceived as sovereign 
bailouts or monetary financing (Rogers et al., 2014). Thus, per Claeys et al’s (2015) 
calculations, the programs may have to end prematurely, with total purchases less 
than the planned amount, to avoid breaking this rule. This diminished quantity, along 
with the focus on the financial sector, might well create a more muted influence on the 
corporate market than the Fed’s program. 
 
Fahr et al. (2013) use a DSGE model to estimate the hypothetical impact of US QE, 
were it to be implemented in the eurozone, and provide supportive conclusion for its 
usage. However, they caution that this result would hold only under the assumption 
that monetary policy transmission is not impaired, which is not as applicable to the 
euro area as it is the US. Despite all these differences, many authors (such as Fahr et 
al.,2013, Lenza et al., 2010, Giannone et al., 2012) agree that they arise from the 
different structure of the financial systems across the Atlantic, and that the two areas 
share more similarities than often argued. 
 
 
2.4 The impact of QE on corporate bonds 
 
The bond market is the linchpin of a well-functioning economy. They account for a 
considerably portion of institutional investors’ portfolio. From a corporate finance 
perspective, it is preferable to obtain financing via debt to equity. As indicated, the 
bond market, either the interbank market or the corporate bond market, accounts for 
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most of external financing in Europe and the US (Trichet, 2009). Therefore, it is hardly 
any surprise that most research on QE focuses on its impact on the bond market, 
rather than the equity market. 
 
Nevertheless, this body of literature predominantly studies relatively riskless assets, 
namely Treasury securities, with fewer academics studying the impact on riskier 
instruments such as corporate bonds. A probable explanation is that QE programs 
entail primarily purchases of such risk-free assets. As such, their impact should be 
most pronounced for the markets of those assets. For example, Krishnamurthy and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) imply that purchases of mortgage-backed securities in US 
QE1 drive large reductions in mortgage rates. Regarding announcement effects, 
Rogers et al. (2014) prove that assets that central banks intend to buy witnessed the 
most dramatic move in prices. On the international level, due to imperfect correlation 
between global bond returns, the reduction in US bond yields due to an announcement 
of US bond purchase should be greater than that in foreign bond yields (Neely, 2011).  
 
Regardless, Joyce et al. (2012) rightly point out that the ultimate target of monetary 
policy is the private market, i.e. households and corporations.  The spillover effect from 
the purchased assets to private assets that were largely left untouched is partially 
established within QE research. According to portfolio balance theory, investors 
consider different asset classes as (imperfect) substitutes. The QE-induced reduction 
in yields of purchased assets such as Treasury or mortgage-backed securities renders 
other classes, such as corporate bonds, more attractive (Gagnon et al, 2011). The 
ensuing increase in demand for these substitutes bids up their prices and lowers their 
yields. However, the paper finds that this spillover effect is not as sturdy as the original 
impact on the purchased assets. Although the ECB, via CBPPs or CSPP, does 
purchase private assets outright, the quantity is not comparable to that for sovereign-
backed, safer securities. Similarly, Rogers et al. (2014), who survey the US, UK, euro 
area, and Japan, find that the spillover from bond yields to other asset prices is most 
pronounced for the US. 
 
A few papers directly assess the impact of unconventional policies on the corporate 
sector rather than abstracting from investigations of government bonds. Lo Duca et al. 
(2015) establish a connection between the rise in global corporate bond issuance, 
 Page 19 of 59 
especially in emerging markets, and US QE. They argue that the issuance serves as 
a tool to fill the supply “gap” created by large-scale asset purchases by the Fed. A 
reasonably inference is that QE successfully increased investors’ risk appetite and 
stimulated demand for riskier assets. Approaching from a different aspect, Gilchrist 
and Zakrajšek (2013) employ both the event-style regression and identification 
through heteroskedasticity to quantify the effect of US QE announcements on 
corporate credit risk of both the financial and non-financial sector. However, their 
results only indicate a reduction in corporate credit risk for the non-financial sector, 
including corporations, using the latter method. 
 
Despite uncertainty in findings, both papers above contribute to relatively 
underresearched areas within the QE literature: the former studies the international 
effect of QE and the latter tackles a rather novel dependent variable – credit risk. 
These two aspects are also the main contributions of this thesis, which studies the 
impact of US and ECB QE on corporate bond volatility, considering cross-country 
spillovers. It also updates the narrative to include the newly implemented ECB asset 
purchase programs. 
 
 
2.4.1 International effects of QE programs 
 
Compared to the domestically-oriented research, the literature for the international 
effect of QE, especially US QE, is smaller yet growing. Neely (2010) is one the 
pioneers in the topic. His paper is strongly related to Gagnon et al. (2011), retaining 
the focus on long-term risk-free yields and the portfolio balance channel. Just as 
Gagnon et al. (2011) use the portfolio balance channel to explain the spillover effect 
from purchased assets to other assets, Neely (2010) applies the same channel for 
foreign assets with attractive yields. Also using an event study, he concludes that US 
QE announcements immediately reduced long-term US and foreign bond yields and 
simultaneously depreciated the dollar. Figure 5 generally validates this conclusion, 
with long-term government bond yields plunging at or in anticipation of the 
commencement of US QE and only rebounded during US QE3 when recovery was 
well underway. Overall, yields of all economies saw drastic reductions vis-à-vis the 
pre-QE levels, except for Japan, which has always had stable, low interest rates. 
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Figure 5: Evolution of select 10-year government bond yields over the course of US QE. 
Source: Investing.com 
 
Subsequent studies expand the narrative to consider other transmission channels, 
namely the signaling channel, and the cross-country conditions that best support 
each channel (Bauer and Neely, 2014)2. They find that while signaling effects are 
most prominent for countries with strong yields response to US conventional 
monetary announcements like Canada, portfolio balance channel is the key 
transmission mechanism for countries whose yields covary with US yields (Germany, 
Australia). 
 
The international signaling channel rests on the premise that a central bank’s policy 
is informative of that of its foreign counterpart (ibid). Indeed, such policy rate linkage 
is evident in reality, especially for countries that are very economically integrated. In 
fact, it contributed to the propagation of the crisis in the first place, consistent with 
theory of financial contagion. Financial contagion refers to the “significant increase in 
cross-market linkages after a shock to an individual country” (Dornbusch et al., 
                                            
2 For a detailed discussion of all QE transmission channels, see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011) 
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2000). It is the propagation of that (mostly negative) shock to linked economies, 
resulting in the covariance of exchange rates, equity prices, bond spreads, and 
capital flows. One of its fundamental cause is competitive devaluations, wherein 
crisis-induced devaluation of a country’s currency puts pressure on another currency 
in terms of export competitiveness in a third market. Subsequently, both currencies 
exhibit strong comovements that could lead to a full-blown currency war (ibid). As 
acknowledged in section 2.2.2, QE as a tool to address the crisis and contagion may 
actually risk increasing the likelihood of such a disastrous event. However, as Bauer 
and Neely (2014) indicate, that shortcoming may be more than compensated for by 
the fact that exchange rate stabilization, i.e. restrained devaluation, can engender 
closer alignment of central banks’ policies, thereby catalyzing the salutary effects of 
the signaling channel. Along with perceivably very strong regional economic ties, it 
might culminate in clear Canadian yield response to US monetary policy, as 
mentioned above. Therefore, although contagion largely denotes deleterious shocks, 
its transmission mechanism may also help administer the cure that is QE. 
 
A promising explanation for the strong portfolio balancing channel between US QE 
and Germany and Australia, again drawing on financial contagion theory, is the solid 
financial link between the countries via large cross-holdings. As per Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1998), the interregional holdings serve as strategic hedging against 
macroeconomic risks that is essential for global financial portfolio diversification. It 
could be these holdings that caused considerable covariance in the excess returns 
of these government bonds, as discovered in Bauer and Neely (2014). German and 
Australian bonds could also be viewed as relatively good substitutes for US bonds, 
whose supply is drastically slashed under QE programs. With higher contagion 
likelihood and stronger portfolio balancing, we can therefore expect higher volatility 
response to foreign large-scale asset purchases from these country pairs.  
 
From a different perspective, these financial linkages expedited the increase in 
illiquidity in international interbank market, thus helping the crisis spread. 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) note that a shock to investor’s funding 
constraints, causing liquidity demand to overpower supply, increases market volatility 
via a rise in risk aversion and liquidation of positions, culminating in even more 
illiquidity. Allen and Gale (2000) further stress that this liquidation takes place first 
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and foremost with claims on other regions, denying liquidity to those who need it the 
most. This is the fundamental cause of international financial contagion via the 
liquidity channel because of cross-holdings. Importantly, however, central bankers 
can again utilize this channel to deliver QE. To the extent that illiquidity causes 
spikes in cross-region volatility, the pumping of liquidity via central bank asset 
purchases into the markets should reduce volatility in all regions. 
 
Overall, while the signaling and portfolio balancing channels explain how QE has its 
international effects, expected and observed variations in those effects between 
countries are best accounted for by the linkages between them. The stronger the 
link, the more pronounced QE’s impact on the market’s bond volatility. 
 
On a different but related note, Craine and Martin (2008) find that US conventional 
monetary policy surprise impacts the Australian market but surprises from Australia 
have little relevance for the US equity market. This asymmetry apparently also applies 
for UMPs, with the influence of US shocks on non-US (British, European, Japanese) 
yields much more considerable than those of non-US shocks on US yields (Rogers et 
al., 2014). 
 
2.4.2 QE and corporate bond volatility 
 
The key contribution of this thesis is the emphasis on a new dependent variable – 
bond volatility. An increase in investor perception of volatility will make them demand 
more premium to hold long-term government bonds, which in turn makes government 
financing less accessible (Steeley & Matyushkin, 2014). Since government spending 
constitutes a significant portion of GDP in major economies, this dampens the very 
economic growth that QE is designed to stimulate. For the riskier corporate bonds, the 
effect may be even more drastic. Cai and Jiang (2008) demonstrates that corporate 
bond volatility has strong predictive power of corporate excess returns. 
 
As shown by Figure 6, the US Treasury market volatility, measured by the MOVE 
index, has been on a steady decline since its peak in the financial crisis. This 
downward trend in bond market volatility may be attributed to successful 
implementation of QE for several reasons. First, the market may interpret central 
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banks’ activist role in the market as a sign of a stable future path of interest rates-
consistent with the signaling channel, reducing uncertainty around the key input to 
bond pricing. Second, due to documented soothing effect of QE, it can also affect 
volatility via the reduction of credit risk and default risk premia (Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 
2013). In other words, the market may feel more assured given the intermediation by 
central banks. Third, via the portfolio balance channel discussed, QE increases 
demand for relative high-yield corporate bonds, thus potentially creating more stability 
in demand. These bases for the investigation of corporate bond volatility is 
summarized in the conceptual framework below (Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 6: Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate (MOVE) Index. Source: Bloomberg 
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Figure 7: Conceptual Framework 
 
Table 1 provides a summary of the key research on which this thesis draws 
significantly. Generally, research on volatility heavily utilizes generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models. Those focusing 
specifically on QE find that it has a negative impact on volatility. However, results have 
focused more on equity market than bond markets, and none pertains to the corporate 
bond market. The very recent European APPs are also not considered. 
 
Paper Focus Methodology Conclusion 
Tan and 
Kohli (2011) 
Impact of US QE on 
US stock market 
volatility 
AR (1) for VIX 
and GARCH (1,1) 
for S&P 500 as 
well as modified 
CEV model 
US QE1 and QE2 
reduced stock market 
volatility, but their 
conclusion increases 
volatility 
Shogbuyi 
and Steeley 
(2017) 
QE by BoE and Fed 
and UK, US, 
Germany, France, 
Univariate and 
multivariate 
GARCH 
QE reduced equity 
volatility, domestically 
and internationally, but 
UK QE actual purchase 
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Japan equity 
markets 
days saw volatility 
increases 
Steeley and 
Matyushkin 
(2014) 
UK QE and the gilt 
market return 
volatility 
GARCH and 
event study 
QE reversed the six-fold 
increase in gilt volatility 
when the crisis starts 
Steeley 
(2017) 
Volatility of stocks, 
short-term and long-
term UK bonds 
GARCH (1,1) UK QE1,2,3 reduced 
stocks and bond volatility 
to pre-crisis levels 
Christiansen 
(2003) 
Volatility spillover 
from US and 
aggregate European 
bond markets into 
individual bond 
markets 
AR-GARCH. 
Countries divided 
into European 
Monetary Union 
(EMU) and non -
EMU countries. 
For EMU countries, own 
country and EU effects 
significant while US effect 
negligible. 
Hamao et. 
al. (1990) 
Stock market price 
change and 
international price 
volatility effects  
MA (1) – GARCH 
(1,1) 
US and UK volatility had 
spillover effect on the 
Japanese market 
 
Table 1: Summary of key research on QE and volatility/volatility spillovers 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Quantitative easing and conditional volatility 
 
Following the convention in volatility modelling, this thesis will utilize the popular 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) family of 
statistical processes, first introduced by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986), to jointly 
model the mean and variance processes of corporate bond returns, with emphasis 
evidently placed on the latter. In particular, an extended version of the standard 
GARCH – the exponential GARCH (EGARCH) (Nelson, 1991)– is used. We will begin 
with a brief overview of the ARCH models before specifying the model to be fitted to 
the data. 
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The key motivation for Engle’s (1982) seminal work introducing the ARCH model is to 
provide a tool to forecast volatility. One would desire to do this exercise for either risk 
management, asset allocation, or derivatives pricing and strategy (Reider, 2009). 
Before ARCH, academics had practically ignored the need to forecast volatility in favor 
of mean returns (Engle, 2001). ARCH tackles an intrinsic assumption in the least 
square models – homoscedasticity of the error term, i.e. constant volatility. In practice, 
by casting even a cursory look at some financial time series data, such as those to be 
examined here, one could find evidence contradicting this. Volatility clustering, 
meaning some periods are riskier than others, is an acknowledged stylized fact about 
time series (Cont, 2001). Instead of assuming homoscedasticity, Engle (1982) 
attempts to capture and model heteroscedasticity of asset returns, thereby providing 
a measure for conditional, non-constant volatility. In addition, the model also captures 
other facts about asset returns, namely autocorrelation of squared returns, volatility 
mean reversion, and excess kurtosis (Reider, 2009). 
 
In the basic ARCH(1) process, 
Rt = μ + ϵt 
ϵt | Ωt-1 ~ N(0, 𝜎t
2) where 
𝜎t
2 = α0 + α1 ϵt−1
2  with α0 > 0 and 1 > α1 ≥ 0 
 
ϵt is the error term that captures excess return whose conditional variance 𝜎t
2 is a 
positive linear function of the squared of last period’s error term. It is assumed to be 
conditionally normal here, but that assumption could be changed to Student’s t or GED 
distributions, both of which can have fat tails. From the model, one can extract this 
conditional variance series and forecast ahead for as long as is needed. Bollerslev 
(1986) then generalizes the model to create GARCH by also permitting lagged 
conditional variance to influence the current conditional variance. Therefore, under a 
GARCH (1,1) specification, 
 
𝜎t
2 = α0 + α1 ϵt−1
2  + β1 𝝈𝐭−𝟏
𝟐   where α0 > 0, α1, β1 ≥ 0 and α1 + β1 < 1 
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Note that the nonnegativity constraints imposed on the parameters in both ARCH and 
GARCH ensure that 𝜎t
2 can never be negative. Nelson (1991), in his paper introducing 
EGARCH, argues that these constraints are ”often violated by estimated coefficients” 
and ”may unduly restrict the dynamics of the conditional variance process”. Further, 
they could have destabilizing effects on the estimation of model parameters. It 
therefore makes sense to replace these constraints. In EGARCH, the same 
nonnegativity requirement of 𝜎t
2 is satisfied by taking the natural log of 𝜎t
2 without 
having to impose any constraints of the parameters as in the linear version.  
 
Further, since 𝜎t
2 is a function of past squared error ϵt−1
2 , only the size and not the 
sign of that lagged error term, which also proxies for shock and its resultant excess 
return, impacts current variance. Thus, the underlying assumption is that ϵt – the shock 
– is synmetric in its effect on volatility. In reality, many researchers, starting with Black 
(1976), find that market declines seem to cause higher volatility than do market 
increases of equivalent magnitude. This is particularly true for broad-based equity and 
bond market indices, as those studied here (Engle, 2001). EGARCH addresses this 
inconsistency by modelling both the sign and the size of the shock. Overall, its main 
advantages over GARCH are two-fold: 1) It simplifies GARCH by removing 
problematic constraints 2) It enhances GARCH with a term that captures an additional 
stylized fact about returns – asymmetry of shocks. 
 
With a good understanding of the underlying model, we now proceed to specify it. The 
basic model is specified as follows: 
 
Ri,t = αi,0 + ∑ θi,j Di,j,t
𝑝
𝑗=1   + αi,1 QEInti,t + αi,2 QEAnni,t + αi,3 Govi,t + di,1 Ri,t-1 + ϵi,t   
          (1) 
ϵi,t | Ωt-1 ~ G(0, 𝜎i,t
2 ,κ) where 
ln(𝜎i,t
2 ) = ωi + αi [
|ϵi,t−1|
√𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2
− √
2
𝜋
 ] + γi  
ϵi,t−1 
√𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2
+ βi ln(𝜎i,t−1
2 ) + ∑ ϕi,j Di,j,t
𝑝
𝑗=1   + λi,1 QEInti,t + λi,2 
QEAnni,t + λi,3 Govi,t 
(2) 
where Ri,t represents the log return on the corporate bond index at time t, i ∈ [US,EU]. 
In spillover analyses, the regressors remain the same (except for AR terms) while the 
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dependent variable is changed to the return of the other party. Ωt-1 denotes the 
information set that comprises all available information at time t – 1. Though 
unexpected, the European return series do exhibit autocorrelations as discussed 
below. This warrants the inclusion of the AR(1) term in equation (1). As mentioned, 
the key contribution of EGARCH is its ability to capture asymmetry in the impact of 
positive and negative shocks. In equation (2), the second term indicates the size of 
the shock while the sign of the shock is captured by the third term. In line with 
observations of asymmetry skewed towards negative shocks, γ is therefore expected 
to be negative and α positive. 
 
Exogenous variables are added to both the conditional mean and conditional variance 
equations to capture the effect of quantitative easing. First, a set of dummy variables 
denote periods of asset purchases, taking value 1 in those periods and 0 otherwise. 
For the US, 4 dummy variables (p = 4) represent QE1 (November 25, 2008 to June 
30, 2010), QE2 (November 3, 2010 to June 30, 2011), MEP (September 21, 2011 to 
December 31, 2012), and QE3 (September 13, 2012 to October 31, 2014). For the 
eurozone, 6 dummy variables (p = 6) represent CBPP (July 2, 2009 to June 30, 2010), 
CBPP2 (November 3, 2011 to 31 October 2012), CBPP3 (20 October 2014 – present), 
ABSPP (21 November, 2014 – present), PSPP (March 9, 2015 – present), CSPP 
(June 8, 2016 – present). As mentioned, though the small size of the CBPPs may 
disqualify them as true QE, they are still relevant because they involve outright 
purchases of private sector assets. 
 
Second, the variable QEIntt, first used by Shogbuyi and Steeley (2017), indicates the 
intensity or size of the asset purchases. Unlike the original paper, it is not separated 
according to different QE periods. The value of the variable on day t is calculated by 
taking the ratio of purchases on that day to the daily average of all prior purchases. 
 
Third, announcement effects are also accounted for by another dummy variable, 
QEAnnt, taking value 1 on days with QE-related policy announcements and zero 
otherwise. Ideally, a standard event study, as employed by numerous studies about 
QE mentioned above, may better capture this effect, although the vast majority only 
pertains to bond returns. Steeley and Matyushkin (2014) is a rare case that conducts 
a volatility-based event study. However, to include other factors, they also have to use 
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a regression-based setting with the dummy variable. Details about announcements of 
interest are provided in Table 2. Since the Fed releases its FOMC announcements at 
14:15 EST, their influence on European markets only manifests on the subsequent 
business day (Abad and Chuliá, 2013). Thus, when modelling spillover from the US to 
Europe, the variable is lagged by one period. 
 
Finally, following Rogers et al. (2014), the model includes a variable related to 
government bond yields (Gov), proxying for monetary policy surprises. The intent is to 
measure the spillover from government securities, the most purchased assets, to 
private sector assets such as corporate bonds, the final target of any QE program. The 
variable is thus a testament to the existence of the portfolio balance channel. Based 
on wide consensus of QE research on government bonds mentioned in the previous 
section, central banks’ power to impact their government bond yields is taken as 
axiomatic. The variable is measured as daily changes in government bond 
yields/prices. For the US, the chosen security is the 10-year Treasury futures. A 
positive change in its price means a reduction in the 10-year rate and a more 
accommodative monetary policy, such as QE. Hence the associated coefficient λ3 is 
expected to be negative, i.e. a price increase/rate decrease reduces volatility. For the 
eurozone, the daily change in the Italian-German 10-year bond spread is used to 
reflect the unique supranational nature of the region3. Contrary to the US, the negative 
change in the spread means QE has successfully reduced the risk premia required to 
hold the riskier Italian bond. The associated coefficient should then be positive. 
 
Results are subject to both diagnostic and robustness tests, whose results can be 
found under section 5. The next section provides a brief description of the time series 
and event data, including rationales for said robustness tests. 
 
 
3.2 Data and summary statistics 
 
                                            
3 Rogers et al. (2014) provides full rationale as to the usage of this unique variable, while Won et al. 
(2013) establish a relationship between surprise changes in a country’s credit spread on the volatility 
of its bond market. 
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3.2.1 Summary of events of interests 
 
Table 2A and 2B present announcements by the ECB and the Fed that could 
potentially amount to monetary policy surprises. Choosing events to be included itself 
is a tradeoff.  While the inclusion of impertinent event dates could distort inferences 
about transmission channels, omitting relevant dates weakens the statistical tests but 
does not lead to any biases, at least when analyzing channels (Krishnamurthy & 
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). Announcements in Table 2 are therefore selected based 
on examination of QE studies utilizing the event study approach, e.g. Lehto (2014), 
Christensen and Rudebusch (2012), Fawley and Neely (2013), Gagnon et al. (2011), 
Fratzscher et al. (2017). This not only ensures the validity of the selection but also 
makes results more comparable. 
 
A potential weakness in the event set is the inclusion of both accommodative and 
restrictive policy announcements. Specifically, announcements about the ending of a 
particular asset purchase program, or the reduction in its size, could be greeted with 
spikes in volatility, depending on the prevailing macroeconomic condition. Indeed, 
when Fed’s Chairman Ben Bernanke referred to the tapering of US QE in 2013, 
investors rapidly withdrew their money from the bond market in panic, resulting in a 
noticeable surge in US Treasury Yield now known as “Taper Tantrum.” Therefore, it is 
possible that results for announcement effect are subject some degree of bias. 
Robustness tests in section 5.2 will correct for this. 
 
The section will also add an additional macro-level indicator, namely the stock market 
volatility, as a control variable. The variable is meant to capture swings in the overall 
economy that might or might not be a direct result of QE implementation. Alternatively, 
it can account for volatility transmission between stock and bond markets. Steeley 
(2006) finds that the correlation between UK bond and equity markets is significantly 
negative. 
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Table 2: Selected ECB and Fed QE Announcements 
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3.2.2 Bond return and summary statistics 
 
Daily closing observations of the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Bond 
(LUACTRUU) and Bloomberg Barclays Euro-Aggregate (LECPTREU) indices from 
2008:Q1 to 2017:Q4 were taken from Bloomberg. Standard log returns are then 
calculated, serving as the key dependent variable in equation (1). QE transaction-level 
data are publicly available from the ECB and Fed websites. It is used to calculate the 
intensity of asset purchases. For the ECB, detailed purchase data are unavailable, so 
purchase amounts are inferred as the difference in daily holdings of purchase 
programs. Finally, government bond yields of the US, Germany, and Italy are collected 
from investing.com. Since GARCH estimation requires continuous variables, all 
missing values are linearly interpolated. 
 
  US EU 
 Mean% 0.00021 0.00018 
 Median% 0.00037 0.00024 
 Maximum% 0.02057 0.00844 
 Minimum% -0.02094 -0.00891 
 Std. Dev.% 0.00336 0.00168 
 Skewness -0.312 -0.708 
 Kurtosis 5.715 6.336 
 Jarque-Bera 841.651 1424.992 
 Probability 1.73E-183 0.000000 
Augmented Dickey-
Fuller -10.416 -20.764 
 Probability 0.000000 0.000000 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of bond returns 2-Jan-08 to 29-Dec-17 (2603 observations) 
 
Summary statistics for the two bond return series are provided in Table 3. It seems 
that US corporate bond returns are twice as volatile as their European counterpart. 
Both return series are negatively skewed and leptokurtic, reflecting the well-known fat-
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tailed nature of asset returns (e.g. Cont, 2001). Along with the Jarque-Bera statistics, 
kurtosis and skewness indicate strong departure from normality. 
 
In addition, the series exhibit some characteristics that would make them potential 
candidates for GARCH modelling. First, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics 
soundly rejects the null hypothesis of the series having unit roots under all test 
specifications (regarding trend and intercept). Therefore, stationarity, a key 
assumption in GARCH models, is satisfied. Weak-sense stationarity, essentially a lack 
of trend as indicated by constant unconditional mean and variance, is a vital 
assumption for time series analysis because it is indispensable for meaningful 
forecasting, which any model is arguably designed to do. Without stationarity, the 
accuracy of the model will be time-variant because the probability density function 
changes and forecasts are, as a rule, impossible. In this investigation, nonstationary 
data might exhibit a different behavior that does not revert to a long-term mean after it 
is subject to a shock in the crisis. Such a change in behavior is very hard to model. 
For example, if volatility consistently increases over time after the shock, so will its 
sample mean and variance, meaning all models will always underestimate the mean 
and variance in future periods. Even for current data, the coefficients may be spurious, 
indicating significant correlation where there is none. 
 
Second, Figure 8 further shows signs of volatility clustering, which GARCH is 
specifically designed to model. 
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Figure 8: US and EU Bond Return (Log) 
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However, the clearest sign of good model fitness is evidence of time varying variance 
structure of the error term, i.e. heteroscedasticity. Excess kurtosis, as discussed, could 
be a symptom of such structure (Steeley and Matyushkin, 2014). More powerful still, 
Bollerslev (1986) shows that one can meaningfully utilize the autocorrelation and 
partial autocorrelation for the squared process to examine time series behavior in 
equation (2). As such, autocorrelation of squared returns will be examined next along 
with autocorrelation in absolute returns. 
 
According to Table 4, the US return series exhibit no autocorrelation, as to be 
expected. Perhaps most dramatic is the significant, positive autocorrelation of EU daily 
bond returns, meaning that one can potentially exploit historical prices to make 
economic profit. This seemingly contradicts the efficient market hypothesis. One 
potential explanation is that component bond returns take different amounts of time to 
react to new information (Shogbuyi & Steeley, 2017). Granted, though significant, the 
level of autocorrelation is only unexpectedly large for the first two orders (>10%) and 
decays rapidly afterwards. An AR(1) term is included in the mean equation for the EU 
return series to correct for this. 
 
Table 4: Autocorrelation of returns 
This table provides the autocorrelation coefficients for daily US and EU bond returns up to lag 10 and the probability 
associated with their respective Q-statistics 
 
  AC(1) AC(2) AC(3) AC(4) AC(5) AC(6) AC(7) AC(8) AC(9) AC(10) 
US 
Return -0.025 -0.007 0.03 0.021 -0.014 0.022 0.000 0.019 0.007 0.060 
 
(0.195) (0.407) (0.24) (0.258) (0.328) (0.312) (0.419) (0.434) (0.52) (0.062) 
EU 
Return 0.152 0.103 0.079 0.078 0.034 0.034 -0.003 0.025 0.029 0.02 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Table 5 presents the autocorrelation of the squared returns, which is more relevant to 
predict the behavior in the variance process, i.e. equation 2, that the thesis is 
attempting to model. All squared returns exhibit significant autocorrelations that are 
much larger in magnitude compared to those in Table 4. The first order autocorrelation 
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is 27.2% for the eurozone and 20.3% for the US. Though not extremely high, such 
significant, positive autocorrelation of squared returns is rare when studying economic 
time series. It is a clear implication of ARCH effects in the variance process (Engle, 
2001). 
 
Table 5: Autocorrelation of squared returns 
This table provides the autocorrelation coefficients for daily US and EU squared bond returns up to lag 10 along 
with the probability associated with their respective Q-statistics 
 
  AC(1) AC(2) AC(3) AC(4) AC(5) AC(6) AC(7) AC(8) AC(9) AC(10) 
US 
Return 0.203 0.142 0.097 0.086 0.148 0.208 0.211 0.203 0.231 0.094 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EU 
Return 0.272 0.253 0.135 0.153 0.116 0.081 0.124 0.105 0.119 0.106 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
After tentative indications of model fitness are observed, the paper now proceeds to 
fit the specified model in equation 1 and 2 to the data. This section conducts parameter 
estimation for four different EGARCH specifications, capturing both domestic and 
international spillover effect of QE programs by the Fed and the ECB. All parameters 
are estimated by maximum likelihood using the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH) 
algorithm and Marquardt steps in EViews (Berndt et al.,1974). 
 
Table 6: Estimated parameters of the mean process (Equation 1) 
This table provides the results from the maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters of the model 
Ri,t = αi,0 + ∑ θi,j Di,j,t
𝑝
𝑗=1   + αi,1 QEInti,t + αi,2 QEAnni,t + αi,3 Govi,t + di,1 Ri,t-1 + ϵi,t , where ϵi,t | Ωt-1 ~ G(0, 𝜎i,t
2 ,κ) and 
ln(𝜎i,t
2 ) = ωi + αi [
|ϵi,t−1|
√𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2
− √
2
𝜋
 ] + γi  
ϵi,t−1 
√𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2
+ βi ln(𝜎i,t−1
2 ) + ∑ ϕi,j Di,j,t
𝑝
𝑗=1   + λi,1 QEInti,t + λi,2 QEAnni,t + λi,3 Govi,t 
 
Ri,t is the daily log return of the corporate bond market i index at time t, i ∈ [US,EU]. The information set Ωt-1 
includes all available information at time t – 1. The dummy variables Di,j,t denotes QE phases: QE1, QE2, QE3, 
MEP in the US; CBPP, CBPP2, CBPP3, ABSPP, PSPP, CSPP in Europe. The variable QEInti,t is the intensity of 
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daily asset purchases. QEAnni,t is another dummy variable, taking value one on QE announcement dates (Table 
2) and zero otherwise. US dates are lagged by one period when they influence European returns. The variable 
Gov measures the pass through from changes in yields/prices of government securities. Probabilities associated 
with z-statistics are provided in parentheses below their estimated coefficients. 
 
  All estimated coefficients except α3 and d1 are x 102                   
 
Constant 
 
QE Phases 
 
QE 
Intensity 
 
QE 
Announcement 
Government 
securities 
 
AR(1) 
 
α0 
 
θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6 
 
α1 
 
α2 α3 
 
d1 
US Quantitative Easing 
            
US 0.0107 
 
0.0228 
-
0.0198 
-
0.0022 0.0127 
   
0.0068 
 
-0.0017 0.8261 
  
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.024) (0.028) (0.604) (0.044) 
   
(0.426) 
 
(0.002) (0.000) 
  
EU 0.010 
 
0.016 -0.022 0.011 0.020 
   
0.012 
 
0.045 0.176 
 
0.083 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.107) (0.071) (0.024) (0.004) 
   
(0.164) 
 
(0.076) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
                
Europe Quantitative Easing 
            
EU 0.025 
 
0.011 0.003 0.010 -0.004 -0.016 -0.005 
 
0.000 
 
0.004 0.008 
 
0.065 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.145) (0.686) (0.540) (0.822) (0.099) (0.590) 
 
(0.852) 
 
(0.923) (0.000) 
 
(0.001) 
US 0.019 
 
0.028 0.025 -0.065 0.106 -0.030 -0.009 
 
0.000 
 
-0.092 0.019 
  
  (0.032) 
 
(0.165) (0.095) (0.194) (0.057) (0.312) (0.650) 
 
(0.902) 
 
(0.195) (0.000) 
  
 
Table 6 reports the estimation results for the conditional mean process while Table 7 
displays the parameters for the conditional variance process. Both tables are divided 
into an upper and lower panel, which focus on the impact of US and Europe QE 
respectively. The following section focuses on the domestic effect of those programs. 
International effects then follow. In each of those discussions, results for the 
conditional mean process (Table 6) come first, although the emphasis is obviously on 
those in Table 7. 
 
 
4.1. Impact of Fed and ECB QE on domestic corporate bonds 
 
The conditional mean equation (Table 6) is first examined. As US QE programs were 
heavily anticipated, and those in Europe even more so as they followed both US QE 
and a period of policy inefficacy, it is expected that the bulk of the impact will be in the 
variance process. For the eurozone, most QE periods do seem to have insignificant 
impact on the mean of bond returns. The US is different in that except for QE3, all 
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other programs are associated with an increase in bond returns, consistent with the 
portfolio balancing channel. As investors seek to replenish their portfolios as relative 
supply of government securities shrinks, corporate bonds might well have been an 
ideal candidate, even more so than equities (Joyce et al., 2017). However, PSPP, the 
ECB’s largest purchase program produces effects that seemingly contradict portfolio 
balance theory, despite being very comparable to US QE1. That period is 
characterized with a negative, albeit barely significant (p=0.099) response in corporate 
bond returns, indicating a reduction (rather than an increase) in corporate bonds 
demand, price, and hence returns. The cause may lie in the eurozone’s supranational 
nature, wherein purchases are conducted in uneven amounts in countries of different 
financial market sizes. 
 
Purchase intensity is insignificant for both markets (α1, Table 6). Only US QE 
announcements are generally accompanied by a reduction in returns (α2, Table 6). 
Changes in prices/yields of government securities apparently also have very 
significant influences on corporate bond returns (α3, Table 6). An increase in the price 
of US 10-year Treasury Futures, which reflects investors’ expectation of a rate cut, 
either directly or via QE, causes US corporate bond returns to rise. European markets 
once again witness surprising results. Specifically, if the Italian-German yield spread 
increases – signifying worsening conditions, investors are more likely to exhibit “flight-
to-quality” rather than risk-taking behaviors by investing in relatively riskier assets like 
corporate bonds as the coefficient seems to imply. However, relative to the US, the 
magnitude of this coefficient is drastically smaller. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the variance process (Table 7) offers more telling evidence. Almost all 
EGARCH parameters are highly significant. γ is negative, implying volatility asymmetry 
in which negative shocks have larger impacts than positive ones of the same size. The 
coefficient associated with the past conditional variance (GARCH effect) suggests 
volatility is quite persistent, especially in Europe where β = 0.941. As figure 9 
demonstrates, both markets witnessed a massive spike in volatility in 2008 after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers marked the official start of the crisis. 
 
Regarding the variables related to QE periods (ϕ, Table 7), the expected result would 
be that those periods witness a reduction in volatility, either to pre-crisis level or even 
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below that. Accordingly, we should expect the coefficient to be statistically insignificant 
or significantly negative. Results in Table 7 suggest that this is true for most QE 
periods, as does the visualization in Figure 9. In the US, while QE2 and QE3 drive 
bond volatility down to levels below those prior to their implementation, volatility in the 
MEP and QE1 periods is not significantly different from the level pre-crisis. In the 
eurozone, the results are qualitatively similar. A crucial exception is, again, PSPP in 
the eurozone, which seem to cause an increase in volatility. This is also in 
contradiction with previous QE studies (e.g. Shogbuyi and Steeley, 2017, Tan and 
Kohli, 2011), although these studies never examined corporate bonds. One possible 
explanation is that while PSPP mitigated the consequences of the crisis, especially in 
the government bond market, private financial market and macroeconomic indicators 
suggested that the economy was still fragile (Joyce et al., 2011), possibly due to its 
slow pass-through (Peersman, 2011). But the fact that PSPP both reduced return and 
increased volatility may suggest intrinsic structural flaws. Criticism of the program is 
not inexistent, see e.g. van Lerven (2016). One should keep in mind, however, that 
ECB’s programs are yet to be completed and critique such as this at this point may 
not be justified. Besides, it can be seen clearly from Figure 9 that spikes in the PSPP 
period eventually subsided, although it may not be wholly ascribed to the program 
alone as it is conducted in tandem with 3 other asset purchase programs. In fact, since 
CSPP involves outright purchases of corporate debt, it could be a more likely cause 
of volatility decline. 
 
While not significant in Europe, the intensity of asset purchases (λ1, Table 7) in the US 
is an integral factor affecting corporate bond volatility. One could interpret this as solid 
proof of the “quantitative” aspect that differentiates QE and the associated boom in 
central banks’ balance sheets from mere qualitative changes in their composition. 
Intuitively, large asset purchases should induce more portfolio balancing (and hence 
more volatility.) This is supported by several authors (see section 2.2.2) who advocate 
increasing the size of asset purchases and, to a lesser extent, the fact that “tapering” 
announcements shook markets so much. On the other hand, the negative effect on 
volatility does temporarily reverse the overall increase in price stability that is central 
to QE, or any other monetary policies. It is thus imperative that such volatile episodes 
discontinue eventually, which they fortunately do in reality. The insignificance of the 
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variable for the eurozone might stem from errors that occur in its inference and 
calculations, given that explicit purchase data is not readily available. 
 
QE-related announcements (λ2, Table 7), appear to cause, or at least not effectively 
resolve, market uncertainty. On the one hand, investors could perceive 
announcements of prolonged accommodative policy (which could characterize most 
announcements in Table 2) as a sign of sluggish recovery of the economy. On the 
other hand, as mentioned in Section 3.2.1, the inclusion of some restrictive policies in 
the variable could produce some perverse effect on interpretation. However, results in 
Table 7 concur with authors who do have a diverse set of announcements such as 
Steeley and Matyushkin (2014) and Abad and Chuliá (2013). Other authors redress 
the potential conflict in direction of impact with an event study, which treats each event 
separately instead of aggregating their effect. In the aggregate setting of a regression 
analysis, Joyce and Tong (2012), by using intra-day data, successful captured the 
impact of the variable on bond yields. In a later section, this paper will redo the 
estimation with only those announcements deemed accommodative. 
 
Table 7: Estimated parameters of the variance process (Equation 2) 
 
This table provides the results from the maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters of the model 
Ri,t = αi,0 + ∑ θi,j Di,j,t
𝑝
𝑗=1   + αi,1 QEInti,t + αi,2 QEAnni,t + αi,3 Gov + di,1 Ri,t-1 + ϵi,t , where ϵi,t | Ωt-1 ~ G(0, 𝜎i,t
2 ,κ) and 
ln(𝜎i,t
2 ) = ωi + αi [
|ϵi,t−1|
√𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2
− √
2
𝜋
 ] + γi  
ϵi,t−1 
√𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2
+ βi ln(𝜎i,t−1
2 ) + ∑ ϕi,j Di,j,t
𝑝
𝑗=1   + λi,1 QEInti,t + λi,2 QEAnni,t + λi,3 Gov 
 
Ri,t is the daily log return of the corporate bond market i index at time t, i ∈ [US,EU]. The information set Ωt-1 
includes all available information at time t – 1. The dummy variables Di,j,t denotes QE phases: QE1, QE2, QE3, 
MEP in the US; CBPP, CBPP2, CBPP3, ABSPP, PSPP, CSPP in Europe. The variable QEInti,t is the intensity of 
daily asset purchases. QEAnni,t is another dummy variable, taking value one on QE announcement dates (Table 
2) and zero otherwise. US dates are lagged by one period when they influence European returns. The variable 
Gov measures the pass through from changes in yields/prices of government securities. Probabilities associated 
with z-statistics are provided in parentheses below their estimated coefficients. 
 
  
Consta-
nt 
 
EGARCH(1,1) 
 
QE Phases 
 
QE 
Intensity 
QE 
Announ-
cement 
 
Government      
securities 
  ꙍ 
 
α γ β 
 
ϕ1 ϕ2 ϕ3 ϕ4 ϕ5 ϕ6 
 
λ1 λ2 
 
λ3 
US Quantitative Easing 
              
US -3.762 
 
0.494 -0.104 0.740 
 
-0.046 -0.229 -0.120 -0.050 
   
0.285 1.860 
 
-38.448 
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(0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.485) (0.007) (0.011) (0.341) 
   
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
EU -0.660 
 
0.159 -0.070 0.959 
 
-0.022 -0.006 -0.026 -0.041 
   
0.033 0.004 
 
-1.525 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.179) (0.739) (0.016) (0.966) 
   
(0.058) (0.976) 
 
(0.621) 
                  
Europe Quantitative Easing 
              
EU -0.932 
 
0.212 -0.043 0.941 
 
-0.039 0.000 -0.131 0.028 0.100 -0.025 
 
0.000 0.623 
 
0.826 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
 
(0.059) (0.996) (0.006) (0.609) (0.014) (0.159) 
 
(0.615) (0.003) 
 
(0.028) 
US -0.126 
 
0.058 -0.007 0.993 
 
-0.006 -0.007 -0.028 0.047 -0.024 0.001 
 
0.000 -0.065 
 
1.049 
  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.377) (0.000) 
 
(0.113) (0.014) (0.212) (0.077) (0.010) (0.847) 
 
(0.305) (0.570) 
 
(0.000) 
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Figure 9: Conditional volatility of domestic QE 
 
Finally, the pass-through effect from government securities (λ3, Table 7) is estimated 
to be significant and in the expected direction in both markets. US large-scale asset 
purchase programs have had the proven effect of reducing long-term government 
bond yields, as reflected in the increase in the price of US 10-year Treasury Futures 
over the sample period (Figure 10). A negative coefficient here suggests that volatility 
has generally declined during the same period and prices and returns have stabilized 
since the onset of the crisis. In Europe, QE’s effect on the government bond market is 
proxied by the Italian-German yield spread. The spread did not peak in 2008, but rather 
at the height of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2011, and steadily declined 
afterwards. A positive coefficient implies that volatility in Europe has also declined. 
This is probably the most important piece of evidence substantiating the value of QE, 
as all central bankers would wish for their policies to impact the private sector and the 
real economy. The results also offer concrete proof of the portfolio balance channel 
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.005
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that crucially facilitates QE transmission to the desired target, i.e. the corporate sector 
in this instance. 
 
 
4.2. Impact of Fed and ECB QE on international corporate bonds 
 
The spillover effect of asset purchase programs is investigated next. From existing 
literature, asymmetry is expected, with US programs having larger effect on European 
markets rather than vice versa. The analysis benefits greatly from the fact that the 
Fed’s and the ECB’s programs largely do not coincide, unlike e.g. the US and the UK, 
allowing a quite clear separation of effects. This particularly pertains to the ECB’s 
largest programs, CBPP3, ABSPP, PSPP, and PSPP, which only commenced after 
US QE3 had wrapped up in 2013 and were expected to have the largest impact. 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Italian-German 10-year Yield Spread
      
110
115
120
125
130
135
140
08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
US 10-Year Treasury Futures Price
 
 
Figure 10: Evolution of selected government-related securities over sample period 
 
In the conditional mean equation, the estimates (Table 6) suggest that US QE3 and 
MEP resulted in an increase in European return. QE1’s influence on European 
corporate bonds was found to be insignificant and QE2 may have reduced returns (p 
= 0.071). ECB’s CBPP2 and ABSPP witnessed a rise in US returns. In addition, the 
spillovers from both markets’ government securities into the each other corporate 
bonds is significant. Their impacts also have the same sign/direction as they did for 
domestic markets. While such impact is drastically more muted for US QE, it 
surprisingly grows a little for European QE, implying that the programs affected foreign 
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markets even more than they did domestic markets. Granted, the coefficient is again 
much smaller in magnitude compared to US QE. Purchase intensity for both regions 
and announcement effect for the eurozone are insignificant. 
 
The focus is once again on the time-varying variance process. As shown in Table 7 
and Figure 11, all US QE periods saw a drop in eurozone corporate bond volatility to 
pre-crisis level, with QE3 reducing it even further. Equally potent, EU QE periods also 
saw a decrease in US bond volatility, either to pre-crisis level or below that. The 
exception is ABSPP, which actually saw an increase in US corporate bond volatility. 
However, the onset of ABSPP in November 2014 also coincided with a dramatic 
worsening of the global oil crash, which understandably culminated in turbulent 
financial markets. This might well have introduced some bias into the variable. 
 
While European markets are not susceptible to US policy announcements (λ2, Table 
7), they are very much so to the actual implementation of those policies (λ1, Table 7). 
The significant variable capturing US QE purchase intensity is still positive. The 
intensifying of US QE, therefore, seemed to unnerve investors in the European 
corporate bond market, resulting in heightened volatility. Both parameters are 
insignificant when measuring EU to US impact. 
 
The pass-through effect from the sovereign debt market (λ3, Table 7) is again very 
significant, with reducing yield spread in Europe acting to calm market on the other 
side of the Atlantic. While US QE greatly benefited its own market, there is no 
indication that it might have helped European markets. 
 
 Page 44 of 59 
    
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
.005
08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
QE1 QE2 QE3MEP
US to EU
   
.001
.002
.003
.004
.005
.006
.007
.008
08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
CBPP CBPP2 CBPP3
ABSPP
PSPP CSPP
EU to US
 
 
 
Figure 11: Conditional volatility of international QE 
 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
5.1. Model diagnostics 
 
In this section several standard diagnostic tests are employed to ensure adequate 
goodness-of-fit. These include the autocorrelation of the standardized residuals and 
squared standardized residuals, the Lagrange multiplier test for remaining ARCH(1) 
effect, and the Jarque-Bera statistic for the distribution of the standardized residual, 
with the initial assumption being the Generalized error distribution (GED), which 
probably better captures the fat tail nature of asset returns. Results can be found under 
Appendix 1. Generally, the models do not seem to be mis-specified. 
 
Though autocorrelation persist in the residuals, it has been reduced to small enough 
levels to be of negligible practical significance. Further, while it may indicate small 
issues in the conditional mean process, our focus is on volatility in the variance 
process. Here, no ARCH effects remain, as confirmed by the Ljung-Box Q statistic, 
and the ARCH-LM test for most cases. For the EU to US equation, the ARCH-LM 
statistic rejects the null hypothesis of “no remaining ARCH effect”, suggesting an 
additional ARCH lag. The EGARCH(1,2) (with no asymmetric effect, since it was 
insignificant in the original specification) specification removes any residual ARCH 
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effect without qualitatively changing previous conclusions. The Jarque-Bera results 
state that all residuals do not abide by Gaussian distribution, which affirms the initial 
assumption that the errors follow the GED. 
 
 
5.2 Robustness tests 
 
5.2.1 Controlling for macroeconomic volatility 
 
Volatility of the stock market of the region being impacted is added as a control variable 
in both equations. It is represented by broad-based volatility indices: VIX in the US, 
and VSTOXX in the eurozone. The variables are found to be significantly negative for 
US QE and insignificant for EU QE. US corporate bond returns are thus more 
susceptible to market volatility. In the variance process, they are significantly positive, 
in line with expectations that stock market volatility will induce volatility in the bond 
market (Steeley, 2006). 
 
Original results are by and large resilient to the added control variable, as shown in 
Appendix 2. Notable changes include the US operation intensity and the EU portfolio 
balance channel proxy. Both are rendered insignificant by the new variable. Volatility 
in both regions are therefore not subject to changes in the size of daily purchases in 
US QE, as previously found. European asset purchases seem to be transmitted not 
via the portfolio balance channel, but the signaling channel as evidenced by the 
dummy variables for the 6 QE periods. On the contrary, the portfolio balance channel 
that transmits the impact of US QE to European market is now significant, as is the 
domestic channel. The difference in the transmission channel between the two 
programs might be attributed to differences in the total size between US programs and 
early European programs. As stated, all covered bond purchase programs remove a 
meagre amount relative to the market compared to US QE, whose purchases 
eventually accumulated to 20% of GDP (Belke et al., 2017). Though PSPP is clearly 
of considerable proportions, it was not introduced until March 2015, which might 
explain why the variable has not proved robust under stress from a control variable. 
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5.2.2 Adjusted list of announcements 
 
Heterogeneity in the impact of announcements has been identified as a potential factor 
introducing bias into the estimated coefficients and their significance. To eliminate the 
bias, the list in Table 2 is reduced to ensure that all events result in information of 
accommodative policy. Announcements of the slowing, i.e. “tapering”, or ending of 
asset purchases do not belong to this category. Accordingly, the following dates are 
removed: 
 
• For the US: 12 August 2009, 23 September 2009, 4 November 2009, 10 August 
2010, 22 June 2011, 19 June 2013, 18 December 2013, 29 October 2014. 
• For the Eurozone: 30 June 2010, 8 December 2016, 26 October 2017 
 
On September 18, 2013, the Fed defied its chairman’s previous statement about the 
tapering of QE and continued asset purchases at the same rate. This date is added to 
reflect potential (pleasant) market surprise. 
 
Nevertheless, the results indicate no shifts in favor of QE announcements as a tool for 
tackling volatility and return. With respect to return, all QE-related announcements 
exert statistically insignificant effect. They also have the exact same impact as 
discussed in section 4 on conditional variance. Based on these results, the conclusion 
remains that announcements are at best ineffectual and at worst turbulence-causing, 
at least in the corporate bond market. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Overall, the analysis shows that QE is effective in reversing bond market turbulence 
that the 2008 financial crisis left in its wake. QE periods are characterized by significant 
reduction in volatility for both the markets studied, consistent with the signaling 
channel where central banks implicitly commit to prolonged accommodative policy. 
However, they may not respond to changes in the daily purchase rate, suggesting no 
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added benefit of concentrating purchases on particular days as opposed to smoothing 
them over the stated operation period. QE announcements are found to have no 
immediate soothing effect on the market, suggesting weakness of the signaling 
channel in this aspect. The portfolio balance channel is powerful for US programs only, 
where assets had always been purchased in very significant amounts. For Europe, 
evidence of such transmission mechanism is less sturdy, and assessment at this stage 
can be premature given that European programs are still ongoing as of this writing. 
 
Granted, both central banks, the ECB and the Fed, are evidently quite influential in 
terms of generating meaningful impacts on each other’s corporate bond markets, 
which should not be surprising given the integrated nature of global financial markets. 
Specifically, periods of purchase operations on both sides of the Atlantic witnessed 
significant drops in each other’s bond market volatility, even after accounting for their 
own broad market volatility. 
 
Europe’s biggest purchase program, PSPP, while potentially beneficial for US 
investors, might have hurt its own market by both decreasing return and increasing 
volatility. This points to potential design flaws of the program, though one should wait 
until the conclusion of the program before making a complete critique. 
 
 
6.1 Implication for International Business 
 
From a policy maker’s perspective, this thesis offers additional evidence in support of 
unconventional measures to address market turbulence in crises when standard 
policies have become impaired. QE is proved to be a potent tool in helping central 
bankers achieve their core pursuit of price stability. The yield curve, strongly affected 
by monetary policy such as QE, feeds into the pricing of all financial products, which 
in turn facilitate lending that fuels the global economy. Crucially, QE’s ability to spill 
over into private markets means that it indirectly repairs corporate lending and thus 
help businesses develop. Spillover effects into foreign market is also noticeable, 
warranting increased cooperation between major central banks. 
 
 Page 48 of 59 
Given globalization and financial market integration, all international investors and 
corporations should pay close attention of central bank policy implementation, 
especially in major economies such as the US and the eurozone. This should not be 
limited to financial market investors just because QE directly affect such markets. The 
corporate bond market is the linchpin of a healthy economy. With spillover into this 
market established, players should naturally be concerned although admittedly they 
are relatively less directly affect by such substantial policy. 
 
 
6.2 Limitation and suggestion for future research 
 
While this paper attempts to capture the transmission channels that are central to QE, 
results should not be taken to provide definitive answers. Koijen et al. (2017) notes 
that inferring transmission channels from time series analysis of asset prices alone 
can be challenging. Instead, the directly relevant source of data is of movements in 
securities holdings, especially of institutional investors, which may better proxy for the 
flow of funds caused by portfolio balancing. The signaling channel, at least concerning 
QE announcements, is sensitive to the choice of relevant event dates and could be 
much harder to extract due to lack of clear relationships with a variable. While the 
event study methodology is allegedly more appropriate to investigate events, here the 
results are sensitive to the choice of event windows. Therefore, there potentially exists 
much possibilities in researching the avenues through which unconventional monetary 
policy works, which would be vastly useful for policy makers to design their programs 
to ensure the desired results. One could expand on the comprehensive work of 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), who investigate channels from a US 
perspective, to explicitly include the supranational situation of the eurozone. 
 
The channels themselves facilitate the investigation of whether QE had its desired 
effect, but not necessarily why. Future research could, for example, replicate this 
research on a security-level, where nuances in bond characteristics such as ratings 
and maturities can be captured. Literature merging theory of financial contagion, 
largely an instrument spreading destruction, and QE, a hopeful cure to a crisis, is still 
scarce. As discussed, the passage through which the crisis proliferates may also serve 
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as the way to administer corrective measures. How central bankers can manipulate 
typically vulnerable financial integration structures for their own utility is thus of special 
interest. 
 
While the emphasis of this thesis is only on major economies, research of their effect 
on emerging markets is of equal importance. Particularly, major markets in Asia and 
South America deserve closer inspection as to whether the decisions of the ECB and 
the Fed have any bearing on the profitability of their investors. 
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8. APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Model diagnostics 
 
Table 8: Autocorrelation of squared residuals 
This table provides the autocorrelation coefficients for the squared standardized residual of all four estimated 
models up to lag 10 along with the probability associated with their respective Q-statistics 
 
  AC(1) AC(2) AC(3) AC(4) AC(5) AC(6) AC(7) AC(8) AC(9) AC(10) 
US to 
US 0.003 -0.002 -0.006 0.003 0.024 -0.008 -0.011 -0.001 0.062 -0.004 
 
(0.888) (0.987) (0.991) (0.998) (0.904) (0.943) (0.958) (0.980) (0.202) (0.269) 
EU to 
EU 0.006 0.034 -0.017 -0.008 -0.020 -0.032 -0.007 -0.001 0.018 0.024 
 
0.753 0.220 0.283 0.407 0.414 0.266 0.355 0.458 0.473 0.433 
US to 
EU 0.027 0.051 -0.012 -0.010 -0.027 -0.022 -0.015 -0.006 0.010 0.018 
 (0.166) (0.013) (0.028) (0.053) (0.047) (0.051) (0.070) (0.105) (0.143) (0.158) 
EU to 
US 0.041 -0.012 -0.007 -0.004 0.013 0.007 0.047 0.026 0.055 -0.006 
 0.035 0.090 0.176 0.289 0.362 0.471 0.120 0.104 0.012 0.020 
 
Table 9: Model statistics 
This table provides general estimation statistics for the four models estimated 
 
 
 
US to US EU to EU US to EU EU to US 
Adjusted R squared 0.190 0.044 0.190 0.043 
S.E of regression 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Sum squared 
residual 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.028 
Log likelihood 13587.440 13356.600 13587.440 11474.730 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.904 1.780 1.904 2.023 
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Mean dependent 
variable 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
S.D dependent 
variable 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Aikaike Information 
Criterion -10.428 -10.247 -10.428 -8.798 
Schwarz Criterion -10.380 -10.191 -10.380 -8.744 
Hannan-Quinn 
Criterion -10.411 -10.227 -10.411 -8.779 
ARCH LM probability 0.888 0.753 0.167 0.035 
Jarque-Bera stat 
Standardized 
residuals 
(Probability) 
14125.09 
 
(0.000) 
680.37 
 
(0.000) 
604.66 
 
(0.000) 
151.95 
 
(0.000) 
 
 
Appendix 2: Robustness test results 
 
Table 10: Estimated parameters of the mean process (Equation 1) 
 
This table provides the results from the maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters of the extended model 
Ri,t = αi,0 + ∑ θi,j Di,j,t
𝑝
𝑗=1   + αi,1 QEInti,t + αi,2 QEAnni,t + αi,3 Govi,t + αi,4 Voli,t + di,1 Ri,t-1 + ϵi,t , where ϵi,t | Ωt-1 ~ G(0, 
𝜎i,t
2 ,κ) and 
ln(𝜎i,t
2 ) = ωi + αi [
|ϵi,t−1|
√𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2
− √
2
𝜋
 ] + γi  
ϵi,t−1 
√𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2
+ βi ln(𝜎i,t−1
2 ) + ∑ ϕi,j Di,j,t
𝑝
𝑗=1   + λi,1 QEInti,t + λi,2 QEAnni,t + λi,3 Govi,t + λi,4 Voli,t 
 
Ri,t is the daily log return of the corporate bond market i index at time t, i ∈ [US,EU]. The information set Ωt-1 
includes all available information at time t – 1. The dummy variables Di,j,t denotes QE phases: QE1, QE2, QE3, 
MEP in the US; CBPP, CBPP2, CBPP3, ABSPP, PSPP, CSPP in Europe. The variable QEInti,t is the intensity of 
daily asset purchases. QEAnni,t is another dummy variable, taking value one on QE announcement dates (Table 
2) and zero otherwise. US dates are lagged by one period when they influence European returns. The variable 
Gov measures the pass through from changes in yields/prices of government securities. The last variable, Vol, is 
the relevant stock market volatility, captured by volatility indices. Probabilities associated with z-statistics are 
provided in parentheses below their estimated coefficients. 
 
 
All estimated coefficients except α3 and d1 are x 102 
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Constant 
 
QE Phases 
 
QE 
Intensity 
 
QE 
Announcement 
Government 
securities 
Market 
volatility 
 
AR(1) 
 
α0 
 
θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 α3 
 
α1 
 
α2 α3 α4 
 
d1 
US Quantitative Easing 
         
  
  
US 0.070  0.042 -0.032 -0.010 0.026    0.035  -0.164 0.831 -0.004 
  
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.024) (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
EU 0.045  0.019 -0.028 0.004 0.030    0.025  0.042 0.181 -0.002 
 
0.082 
 
(0.000)  (0.066) (0.022) (0.389) (0.000)    (0.003)  (0.120) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
              
 
 
Europe Quantitative Easing            
 
 
EU 0.035  0.015 0.007 0.012 -0.004 -0.015 -0.010  0.000  0.003 0.008 0.060 
 
-0.001 
 
(0.001)  (0.071) (0.395) (0.394) (0.780) (0.138) (0.320)  (0.718)  (0.953) (0.000) (0.245) 
 
(0.003) 
US 0.016  0.032 0.024 -0.065 0.099 -0.024 -0.004  0.000  -0.099 0.019 0.000 
  
 
(0.445)  (0.149) (0.122) (0.021) (0.016) (0.494) (0.865)  (0.817)  (0.097) (0.000) (0.901) 
  
 
Table 11: Estimated parameters of the variance process (Equation 2) 
 
This table provides the results from the maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters of the extended model 
Ri,t = αi,0 + ∑ θi,j Di,j,t
𝑝
𝑗=1   + αi,1 QEInti,t + αi,2 QEAnni,t + αi,3 Govi,t + αi,4 Voli,t + di,1 Ri,t-1 + ϵi,t , where ϵi,t | Ωt-1 ~ G(0, 
𝜎i,t
2 ,κ) and 
ln(𝜎i,t
2 ) = ωi + αi [
|ϵi,t−1|
√𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2
− √
2
𝜋
 ] + γi  
ϵi,t−1 
√𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2
+ βi ln(𝜎i,t−1
2 ) + ∑ ϕi,j Di,j,t
𝑝
𝑗=1   + λi,1 QEInti,t + λi,2 QEAnni,t + λi,3 Govi,t + λi,4 Voli,t 
 
Ri,t is the daily log return of the corporate bond market i index at time t, i ∈ [US,EU]. The information set Ωt-1 
includes all available information at time t – 1. The dummy variables Di,j,t denotes QE phases: QE1, QE2, QE3, 
MEP in the US; CBPP, CBPP2, CBPP3, ABSPP, PSPP, CSPP in Europe. The variable QEInti,t is the intensity of 
daily asset purchases. QEAnni,t is another dummy variable, taking value one on QE announcement dates (Table 
2) and zero otherwise. US dates are lagged by one period when they influence European returns. The variable 
Gov measures the pass through from changes in yields/prices of government securities. The last variable, Vol, is 
the relevant stock market volatility, captured by volatility indices. Probabilities associated with z-statistics are 
provided in parentheses below their estimated coefficients. 
 
  
Consta-
nt 
 
EGARCH(1,1) 
 
QE Phases 
 
QE 
Intensity 
QE 
Announ-
cement 
Govern-
ment      
securities 
 
Market 
volatility 
  ꙍ 
 
α γ β 
 
ϕ1 ϕ2 λ3 ϕ4 ϕ5 ϕ6 
 
λ1 λ2 λ3 
 
λ4 
US Quantitative Easing 
           
  
  
US -9.422  0.551 0.007 0.378  -0.084 -0.168 -0.168 -0.003    -0.006 2.003 -61.676 
 
0.048 
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.831) (0.000)  (0.508) (0.257) (0.048) (0.976)    (0.953) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
EU -2.050  0.194 -0.080 0.870  -0.039 0.048 -0.045 -0.018    -0.011 0.180 -12.565 
 
0.008 
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.195) (0.180) (0.029) (0.466)    (0.716) (0.402) (0.003) 
 
(0.000) 
 
                
 
 
Europe Quantitative Easing              
 
  
EU -2.997  0.236 -0.066 0.802  -0.136 -0.006 -0.330 -0.016 0.332 -0.009  0.001 0.868 0.704 
 
0.010 
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(0.000)  (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)  (0.004) (0.823) (0.007) (0.891) (0.001) (0.802)  (0.348) (0.005) (0.159) 
 
(0.000) 
US -8.342  0.211 -0.033 0.349  -0.038 -0.139 -0.977 1.034 -0.019 -0.190  0.000 -0.483 0.012 
 
0.033 
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.325) (0.017)  (0.657) (0.070) (0.003) (0.004) (0.904) (0.062)  (0.877) (0.353) (0.987) 
 
(0.000) 
 
